In June 2013, the fi rst human H6N1 infl uenza virus infection was confirmed in Taiwan. However, the origin and molecular characterization of this virus, A/Taiwan/2/2013 (H6N1), have not been well studied thus far. In the present report, we performed phylogenetic and coalescent analyses of this virus and compared its molecular profi le/characteristics with other closely related strains. Molecular characterization of H6N1 revealed that it is a typical avian infl uenza virus of low pathogenicity, which might not replicate and propagate well in the upper airway in mammals. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the virus clusters with A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 (H6N1) in seven genes, except PB1. For the PB1 gene, A/Taiwan/2/2013 was clustered with a different H6N1 lineage from A/chicken/Taiwan/ A2837/2013. Although a previous study demonstrated that the PB2, PA, and M genes of A/Taiwan/2/2013 might be derived from the H5N2 viruses, coalescent analyses revealed that these H5N2 viruses were derived from more recent strains than that of the ancestor of A/Taiwan/2/2013. Therefore, we propose that A/Taiwan/2/2013 is a reassortant from different H6N1 lineages circulating in chickens in Taiwan. Furthermore, compared to avian isolates, a single P186L (H3 numbering) substitution in the hemagglutinin H6 of the human isolate might increase the mammalian receptor binding and, hence, this strain's pathogenicity in humans. Overall, human infection with this virus seems an accidental event and is unlikely to cause an infl uenza pandemic. However, its co-circulation and potential reassortment with other infl uenza subtypes are still worthy of attention.
INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 2013, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control formally confi rmed the fi rst human infection with an avian infl uenza A (H6N1) virus, and named it A/Taiwan/2/2013 (http://www. cdc.gov.tw/english/infoaspx?treeid=bc2d4e89b154059b&now treeid=ee0a2987cfba3222&tid=E36A5E9AB3D3A216). The patient was a 20-year-old female, diagnosed with pneumonia due to an unconfi rmed type of infl uenza virus, which was subsequently proven to be of the H6N1 subtype. The patient has fully recovered, and no human-to-human transmission has been identifi ed.
Avian infl uenza A (H6N1) virus has been circulating throughout North America (Senne, 2003) and Eurasia (Lee et al., 2006) for many years. In Taiwan, the H6N1 virus has been circulating for over 30 years and is extremely prevalent among poultry, with approximately half of the layers and 30% of the broilers having antibodies against H6N1 influenza viruses ( Lee et al., 2006) . In southern China, H6N1 has established itself in minor poultry species (Cheung et al., 2007) and has been proposed to be the potential progenitor of the humaninfecting H5N1 infl uenza virus A/Hong Kong/156/97 (Hoffmann et al., 2000) . Although human infection with this virus subtype was never reported prior to the Taiwanese case, H6-specifi c (Fig. 1A) . Nevertheless, the branches between the 2013 viruses and 2004/2005 viruses were quite long, indicating the lack of surveillance data. In the NA phylogenetic tree, the 2013 isolates fell into another poultry H6N1 lineage, which consisted of isolates from 2009 to 2010 in Taiwan (Fig. 1B) . This lineage is distant to that of the 2004/2005 isolates in the NA tree, indicating that the 2013 H6N1 infl uenza viruses were possibly reassortants of varied H6N1 lineages.
A comparison of the phylogenetic trees of the internal genes showed that all but the PA gene could be grouped with the 2009/2010 isolates and close to A/Taiwan/2/2013. The closest PA gene to the 2013 isolates was that from A/chicken/Taiwan/0101/2012 (H5N2) (Fig. 2) . Then, the clade clustered with earlier H6N1 strains in Taiwan.
Co-circulating H5N2 infl uenza viruses reassorted with H6N1 viruses in poultry
Consistent with recently published data (Yuan et al., 2013) , in the PB2, PA, and M trees, the closest strains of A/Taiwan/2/2013 and A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 belonged to the H5N2 subtype rather than H6N1 (Figs. 2 and 3) , with the closest strains being A/chicken/Taiwan/0101/2012 (H5N2) for PB2 and PA, and A/chicken/Taiwan/A1997/2012 (H5N2) for M.
antibodies have been detected in live animal market workers in China and in veterinarians exposed to birds in the United States (Shortridge 1992; Myers et al., 2007) . Furthermore, two of 11 healthy human volunteers inoculated with the H6N1 virus displayed mild upper respiratory symptoms, suggesting that this virus has the potential to infect mammals (Beare and Webster, 1991) . In addition, some Taiwanese H6N1 viruses can replicate in mice without pre-adaptation (Lee et al., 2006) . Therefore, clinically asymptomatic or unreported human infections of H6 viruses may have occurred.
In the present report, we performed a molecular and phylogenetic analysis of the fi rst laboratory-confi rmed human-infecting H6N1 infl uenza virus and closely related virus strains. Our results revealed that A/Taiwan/2/2013 is a low-pathogenicity H6N1 influenza virus whose genes may have been derived from different H6N1 lineages circulating in Taiwan.
RESULTS

The human-infecting H6N1 virus is a reassortant of different lineages of poultry H6N1 viruses circulating in Taiwan
To examine the origin of the human-infecting A/Taiwan/2/2013 H6N1 virus, we performed a phylogenetic analysis of related influenza virus genomes. Except for the PB1 gene, the phylogenetic trees of the remaining genes indicated that A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 (H6N1) is closely related to , 2010 (Dec, 2008 , Dec, 2011 ) Oct, 2009 (Feb, 2008 , Jul, 2011 ) May, 2010 (Oct, 2008 , Dec, 2011 pathogenicity with Taiwanese H6N1, we compared the receptor-binding sites of the 2013 isolates with an earlier avian strain A/shearwater/Australia/1/1972 (Fig. 4A) . At the receptorbinding site, the human isolate had a proline to leucine substitution at position 186 (P186L, H3 numbering), which was not observed in the earlier strains or the recent circulating H6N1 lineages. Because of the stronger hydrophobicity of leucine, this substitution is hypothesized to increase the hydrophobicity at the receptor-binding site and thus make HA more likely to bind the mammalian receptor , Xiong et al. 2013 ). This may explain how this H6N1 virus was able to infect humans even though position 226 is a glutamine. The mechanism of the receptor binding switch for the H6N1 virus may be different from that for the H5N1 virus . Moreover, when compared to the receptor-binding site of A/shearwater/Australia/1/1972, the 2013 isolates also contained an E190V substitution, which could also increase the hydrophobicity at the receptor-binding site. These data indicate that the 2013 isolates have evolved from an earlier avian isolate to adapt to human infection. Aside from the P186L substitution in HA, there is only one difference at position 287 that A/Taiwan/2/2013 encodes relative to the poultry strains (Fig. 4B) . However, whether the A287T substitution increases the binding to mammalian recepHowever, the H5N2 viruses did not form independent lineages in the trees (Fig. 3) . Instead, they scattered within H6N1 lineages that have been circulating in Taiwan for over 10 years. Moreover, the branch length between the H6N1 Taiwanese strains from 2013 and their H5N2 relatives was very long.
To further test whether the PB2, PA, and M genes of A/Taiwan/2/2013 and A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 originated from H5N2 strains, we performed a coalescent analysis and calculated the estimated time to most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) for these viruses. The tMRCA of the two H6N1 strains was estimated as early 2011 for the PA gene and before 2011 for the PB2 and M genes (Table 1) , whereas the two H5N2 viruses were isolated in 2012, suggesting that they are more recent strains than the ancestor of the novel human-infecting H6N1 virus. Furthermore, the tMRCA of the two H6N1 strains and the corresponding H5N2 strains was roughly 2008 for the PB2 and M genes, and 2007 for the PA gene (Table 1) , also suggesting that recent reassortment from H5N2 to H6N1 is unlikely.
The proline to leucine substitution at the receptor-binding site tends to increase the affi nity to bind mammalian receptors
To investigate the molecular basis for human infectivity and lian hosts.
T H K Q
The R292K substitution in the NA protein has previously been reported to confer resistance to oseltamivir (Kiso et al., 2011) . The strain A/Taiwan/2/2013 has an Arg at position 301 (equivalent to 292 in N2 numbering), suggesting that the virus is sensitive to oseltamivir. However, the S31N substitution in the M2 protein, which is associated with adamantine resistance (Pinto et al., 1992; Holsinger et al., 1994) , was found in the two 2013 strains. In fact, most of the H6N1 strains circulating in Taiwan had this mutation.
The human-infecting H6N1 infl uenza virus has a truncated PB1-F2 gene
One interesting feature of the A/Taiwan/2/2013 virus strain is the presence of a truncated PB1-F2 gene (Fig. 5) . The G to A substitution at position 267 (from start codon ATG) changed the codon TGG to a stop codon TAG, and thus generates a 57-amino-acid PB1-F2 protein. Compared to the full-length PB1-F2, this protein is unlikely to be functional. As a pro-apoptotic factor, PB1-F2 plays an important role in viral pathogenicity both in vitro and in vivo (Chen et al., 2001; Zamarinet et al., 2006) . In addition, PB1-F2 increases susceptibility to secondary bacterial pneumonia in mice (McAuley et al., 2007) . The truncation in the human H6N1 isolate might lead to the loss of its mitochondrial targeting sequence (Zell et al., 2007) and, therefore, decrease pathogenicity and result in a more localized infection (Meunier and von Messling, 2012) . The detailed function of the PB1-F2 truncation in H6N1 remains unclear, and needs further examinations. 
DISCUSSION
Molecular characterization of the novel human-infecting H6N1 infl uenza virus
The HA cleavage site of the 2013 isolates is the same as that of the 2004/2005 isolates in Taiwan, IATR (see positions 328 and 329 in Fig. 4B ), whereas most of the H6N1 strains in recent years possess either VETR or IETR. The absence of multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site suggests that the novel H6N1 strains have low pathogenicity in chickens and other avian species (Hatta et al., 2001) .
In NA, two deletions, a 12-amino-acid-deletion (from position 42 to 53) and a 2-amino-acid-deletion (aa 68 and 69), in the stalk were observed. These two deletions were also found in a few H6N1 strains circulating from 2001 to 2010. This shortened NA stalk domain is a hallmark of aquatic bird viruses that become adapted to terrestrial poultry (Matrosovich et al., 1999) . Another mammalian signature substitution, PB2 E627K, and the associated D701N were not observed in A/Taiwan/2/2013, suggesting that the strain is less likely to replicate well in the human upper airway and transmit well in mamma-
Protein Cell & MATERIALS AND METHODS
The genome sequences of A/Taiwan/2/2013 (H6N1) and A/chicken/ Taiwan/A2837/2013 (H6N1) were obtained from the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) database, and closely related sequences were downloaded from BLAST searches against GenBank. Multiple sequence alignment for each gene was performed using MUSCLE (Edgar, 2004) . Phylogenetic trees were reconstructed using RAxML (Stamatakis, 2006 ) using the GTRGAMMA model.
The tMRCAs were estimated using the Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo method, implemented in BEAST (Drummond and Rambaut, 2007) . To investigate the extent to which dating estimates are affected by the demographic model chosen, we repeated our analyses using constant size, logistic growth, and exponential growth models, respectively. Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo analyses were run for 40 million steps, but different steps were removed as burn-in. Trees and other parameters were sampled every 10,000 steps. eral key features that could infl uence the pathogenesis of the virus, including the presence of the avian-signature Gln226 in the HA receptor-binding site, the lack of multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site, two deletions in the NA stalk, and Glu627 and Asp701 in PB2 (avian-signatures). Therefore, A/Taiwan/2/2013 tends to be of low pathogenicity, prefers to infect avian hosts, and has adapted well within terrestrial poultry. The Arg292 in NA and Ser31 in M2 indicate that the virus is sensitive to oseltamivir but insensitive to adamantine. The molecular features of the novel H6N1 virus suggest that it is not able to replicate well in human cells and cannot be effi ciently transmitted within mammalian hosts (Glu627 and Asp701 in PB2). Nevertheless, the P186L substitution has provided an increased hydrophobic environment in the sialic acid receptorbinding pocket of HA, and this change possibly enhances its ability to bind to the human receptor. Hence, the receptor binding affi nity of the novel human-infecting H6N1 virus requires further examination in the future. In light of this molecular characterization it is reasonable to assume that the single human infection with this virus in Taiwan was most likely an unfortunate rare event.
A recent publication proposes that A/Taiwan/2/2013 (H6N1) originated from a reassortment between H5N2 (PB2, PA, and M) and H6N1 subtypes based on phylogenetic analyses (Yuan et al., 2013) . However, the formation of the novel H6N1 infl uenza viruses from H5N2 viruses was not fully supported by our phylogenetic and coalescent analyses. First, based on surveillance data, the H5N2 viruses did not form independent lineages in the PB2, PA, and M trees. On the contrary, they fell within an H6N1 lineage circulating in Taiwan for approximately 10 years, indicating that the H5N2 viruses gained gene segments from H6N1 viruses at an earlier time. Second, the long branch between the H6N1 Taiwanese strains from 2013 and the H5N2 relative suggests that unknown evolutionary events may have occurred between the H5N2 to H6N1 viruses, and therefore, direct reassortment is unlikely to have occurred. Finally, coalescent analysis showed that the H5N2 viruses (isolated from 2012) were more recent strains than the ancestor of the novel human-infecting H6N1 virus. This indicates that the ancestral strain transferred the gene to both H5N2 and H6N1 viruses, and from the view of the phylogenetic trees, the ancestor strain is more likely to be an H6 than an H5 virus. Therefore, we hypothesize that A/Taiwan/2/2013 is likely a reassortant from different H6N1 lineages.
Although the emergence of human-infecting H6N1 viruses in Taiwan is unlikely to be due to direct reassortment from H5N2 viruses, the co-circulation of H6N1 and H5N2 viruses in Taiwan still requires close surveillance. Analysis of phylogenetic trees indicates that distinct H6-H5 reassortment events have occurred during the past 10 years. The reassortment of varied subtypes of infl uenza viruses has the potential to cause rapid adaptation and lead to an unexpected evolutionary road (Liu et al., 2013; Morens et al., 2013) . Therefore, extensive surveillance is needed in the future.
